Alec Sinek Research Paper Post

Alec Sinek
Research Paper Post, April 16

This summer I will be working on an Arizona State Senate campaign. Due to this, I focused on the Arizona State Legislature and have come to the conclusion that trends point to less polarization over the last decade, specifically from 2015 on. The last House and Senate session end with passing of various bipartisan bills, such as nuclear emergency response, school shooting drill procedure, and non-partisan appropriations. Their COVID-19 response is similar to California's regarding quarantine, seeing both Republicans in the majority and Democrats come together. Although Republicans have held a majority on both the State Senate and House for the last five decades, 2018 elections resulted in the closest divide between House Democrats and Republicans(31-29) since 1966.

The cause of the more recent (2015-present) decrease in polarization is mainly attributed to a landmark supreme court ruling on partisan gerrymandering, but is also attributed to unique tenets of their legislative process.

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission(2015)
To halt the rampant partisan gerrymandering in Arizona's 9 congressional districts, Arizona voters passed an initiative which gave redistricting powers to an independent non-partisan commission instead of the State Legislature itself. In response, the state legislature sued as they believed the initiative violated the Elections Clause in Article 1 of the Constitution.

The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators.

The Arizona Legislature reasoned that they alone had the authority to set the manner of elections, but the commission's powers were upheld by both the district courts and, later, the Supreme Court. Justice Ginsburg wrote "redistricting is a legislative function to be performed in accordance with the State’s prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum, Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 567, and the Governor’s veto, Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 369. While exercise of the initiative was not at issue in this Court’s prior decisions, there is no constitutional barrier to a State’s empowerment of its people by embracing that form of lawmaking." Basically, the Supreme Court and District Court ruled that because the Arizona State Constitution gave citizens the power to issue the initiatives to empower them, they are not allowed to take away this power when it does not benefit the legislature.

This decision has ensured fairness and bipartisanship in redistricting Arizona for elections. There is no longer gerrymandering and, as a bi-product of the decision, Arizona lawmakers do not quarrel over districts and instead focus on bills and subsequent cooperation.

Other aspects of the decrease in polarization that will be further explored in my paper are inherent in the procedure of Arizona State Legislature:

There is no lieutenant governor role, instead the president of the senate presides over the body and appoints members to committees/subcommittees.

The second-in-line to the Governor position, due to the above contingency, belongs to the Secretary of State in Arizona.

In the senate president's absence, the president pro tempore presides.

A statewide popular vote may call in effect a constitutional convention, the state legislature is powerless in this regard. Any proposed changes at this convention must be approved by a majority in another statewide popular vote.

Other contingencies similar to that above help put the state constitutional editing powers in the hands of the people instead of the majority party in the legislature. Because of these aspects, Senators and House members are forced to abandon partisan politics and instead cooperate to best suit their constituencies.